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Abstract 36 
Recent evidence suggests that great apes can use the former location of an entity to 37 
communicate about it. In this study we built on these findings to investigate the social 38 
cognitive foundations of great apes’ communicative abilities. We tested whether great 39 
apes (n = 35) would adjust their requests for absent entities to previous interactions 40 
they had with their interlocutor. We manipulated the apes’ experience with respect to 41 
the interlocutor’s knowledge about the previous content of the now empty location, as 42 
well as their experience with the interlocutor’s competence to provide additional food 43 
items. We found that apes adjusted their requests to both of these aspects but failed to 44 
integrate them with one another. These results demonstrate a surprising amount of 45 
flexibility in great apes’ communicative abilities while at the same time suggesting 46 
some important limitations in their social communicative skills. 47 
Keywords: communication; common ground; displacement; social cognition; great 48 
apes  49 
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Introduction 50 
 Communication is a social endeavour. Human communication is a social-51 
cognitive endeavour in that humans interpret and produce signals in the light of the 52 
common ground they share with their interlocutor (Clark, 1996; Sperber & Wilson, 53 
2001; Tomasello, 2008). This way of communicating enables a great deal of 54 
flexibility but it entails a considerable degree of cognitive complexity. For example, 55 
by pointing to an empty red chair one could communicate such diverse things as 56 
“This is the colour I want for my kitchen table” or “Where did Petra go?”. In order to 57 
ask about the whereabouts of Petra the pointer has to consider whether the receiver 58 
knows that somebody was sitting on the chair a minute ago as well as whether she 59 
knows that the pointer is looking for someone. This information has to be part of the 60 
common ground between the interlocutors to make the pointing gesture meaningful. 61 
To form common ground, interlocutors have to interact with one another. On the basis 62 
of these interactions humans attribute psychological states such as knowledge, beliefs 63 
or competencies to one another and subsequently consider them in communicative 64 
interactions.  65 
 Human infants engage in communicative interactions that suggest sensitivity 66 
to common ground from their first birthday onwards. They interpret ambiguous verbal 67 
utterances or pointing gestures depending on how they interacted with the speaker 68 
before (Liebal, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; 69 
Saylor & Ganea, 2007; Tomasello & Haberl, 2003). Slightly older children also adjust 70 
their own communicative acts to the prior interactions with their interlocutor (Liebal, 71 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010). The extent to which non-human animals also rely on 72 
common ground for communication is often debated (Leavens et al., 2015; Moore, 73 
2013; Scott-Phillips, 2015b; Tomasello, 2008) but rarely addressed empirically. 74 
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Common ground is one source that specifies the intended referent of an utterance and 75 
it is therefore important in the discussion whether animal signals have (non-natural) 76 
meaning in the same way as human signals do (Grice, 1957; Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014; 77 
Moore, 2015; Scott-Phillips, 2015a).  78 
 Great apes display some abilities that are important prerequisites to use 79 
common ground in communication. They are known to be flexible and intentional 80 
communicators who adapt their communication to the present social context (Call & 81 
Tomasello, 2007; Hobaiter & Byrne, 2011; Leavens, Russell, & Hopkins, 2005). 82 
During communicative interactions with conspecifics, chimpanzees adjust their 83 
gestures to the attentional state of their recipient by actively moving into the line of 84 
sight of the recipient or resorting to tactile gestures (Call & Tomasello, 2007; Liebal, 85 
Call, & Tomasello, 2004; Liebal, Call, Tomasello, & Pika, 2004). In a similar way, all 86 
great ape species prefer to beg food from a human who is attending to them 87 
(Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2004; Tempelmann, Kaminski, & Liebal, 2011). 88 
Outside the realm of communication there is evidence showing that chimpanzees 89 
prefer to approach food items that a competitor cannot see or has not seen (Hare, Call, 90 
Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Karg, Schmelz, Call, & 91 
Tomasello, 2015) suggesting that they expect their competitor to act based on what 92 
she sees or has seen in the immediate past. However, the question is whether great 93 
apes adjust their own communication depending on what the partner has seen in the 94 
immediate past. Recent evidence suggets that this indeed the case. Crockford and 95 
colleagues (2012) found that wild chimpanzees emitted alarm calls depending on 96 
whether or not they witnessed group members receiving information about the 97 
presence of a predator.  98 
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 All the studies reported above are concerned with tracking interactions that 99 
happened in the immediate past. What about information about others derived from 100 
long term interactions? Woodruff and Premack (1979) confronted chimpanzees with 101 
two humans who would, when informed about hidden food, either hand it over to the 102 
subject (cooperative) or take it away (competitive). The competitive human wore a 103 
distinct outfit and behaved in a hostile way toward the chimpanzees outside the 104 
experiment. Subjects initially failed to withhold information from the competitive 105 
human but eventually learned to do so after a substantial amount of training. 106 
However, the long training period suggests that, instead of ascribing enduring 107 
characteristics to a person, subjects learned to inhibit communication in the presence 108 
of a human wearing the competitive outfit.  109 
 To sum up, there is ample evidence that great apes adjust their behavior to 110 
their partner’s psychological states (e.g. seeing or knowing). Furthermore, there is at 111 
least some evidence apes adjust their own communication to these psychological 112 
states if they are the consequence of a relatively recent interaction. However, it is not 113 
clear if they are able to take into account characteristics of others deduced from more 114 
distant interactions with them. Furthermore, to our knowledge, there is no study that 115 
has systematically investigated if great apes are able to integrate two different 116 
psychological states of another individual in a communicative interaction. 117 
A powerful way to investigate the role of common ground in non-linguistic 118 
communication is by studying pointing to absent entities. Language-trained apes have 119 
been reported to use tokens, lexigrams or gestures to refer to absent referents (e.g. 120 
Gardner, Gardner, & Van Cantfort, 1989; Premack & Premack, 1983; Savage-121 
Rumbaugh, McDonald, Sevcik, Hopkins, & Rubert, 1986) and to point to occluded 122 
objects (Menzel, 1999; Roberts, Vick, Roberts, & Menzel, 2014). However, in the 123 
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case of pointing to absent entities, the referent is not present, neither visible nor 124 
occluded, in the moment it is communicated about (see also Lyn et al., 2014 for this 125 
distinction). The interlocutors have to rely on past interactions in which both of them 126 
jointly witnessed the presence of the referent. Recently, Liszkowski, Schäfer, 127 
Carpenter, and Tomasello (2009) tested whether 12-month old human infants and 128 
chimpanzees use pointing to communicate about absent entities. In this study, the 129 
non-verbal subjects had the opportunity to point to the previous location of a now 130 
absent object to request more of it. The underlying assumption was that doing so 131 
requires the subject to keep track of the relevant common ground, in this case the 132 
former content of the location, they share with the individual they request from. 133 
Whereas this study found that only human infants communicate about absent entities, 134 
two subsequent studies found that apes do so as well (Bohn, Call, & Tomasello, 2015; 135 
Lyn et al., 2014). However, even though these studies rely on it for the explanation of 136 
their results, none of them investigated common ground or its prerequisites directly. It 137 
is unclear whether apes base their communicative acts on the psychological states 138 
they attribute to others as a consequence of interacting with them. For example, in a 139 
situation as described above, apes should refrain from pointing to the empty location 140 
in a situation in which their interlocutor doesn’t know about the former content of the 141 
location. Or they should not point in a situation in which the interlocutor lacks the 142 
competence to provide additional objects.  143 
To address these issues, we modified the methodology established by Bohn et 144 
al. (2015). They presented subjects with two plates from which apes could request 145 
food items by pointing. The type of food presented in both plates was either of the 146 
same quality (both high quality: HQ or both low quality: LQ) or of different quality 147 
(one HQ and one LQ). During test trials, one plate still contained food while all items 148 
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from the other plate had already been requested. In general, subjects preferred to point 149 
to the remaining visible food items instead of the empty plate. More importantly 150 
however, whenever subjects pointed to the empty plate they did so in a highly 151 
systematic way. Apes ignored the otherwise desirable visible food item and pointed to 152 
the empty plate only when the visible food item was of lower quality compared to the 153 
absent items. This result showed that apes requested specific absent entities. We 154 
adjusted this procedure to test whether apes would further adjust their communication 155 
about absent entities to the knowledge and competence of their interlocutor. Even 156 
though this setup does not allow us to investigate full-blown common ground (i.e. the 157 
sharedness of the psychological states in question) it tests whether apes consider the 158 
necessary prerequisites to form common ground and thereby allows us to determine 159 
the evolutionary origins of the ability in question. 160 
We presented apes with two plates containing food items of different quality. 161 
As soon as all items from one plate were requested, the experimenter left the room 162 
and, after a short delay, the same or a different experimenter returned. To investigate 163 
the role of the experimenter’s knowledge we tested whether apes would point to the 164 
empty plate differently depending on whether or not the returning experimenter had 165 
seen what was on the plate previously (predictor: see). To investigate the role of the 166 
experimenter’s competence, we tested whether apes would point to the empty plate 167 
differently depending on whether the experimenter did or did not bring additional 168 
food items in an earlier interaction (predictor: bring). If apes would consider both of 169 
these predictors, this would be good evidence that they evaluate the prior interactions 170 
with the experimenter for their relevance in the on-going communicative interaction. 171 
This in turn would suggest that some important prerequisites to form common ground 172 
are evolutionary ancient. Furthermore, by varying the experimenter’s knowledge and 173 
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competence at the same time, we were able to investigate whether apes are able to 174 
integrate different aspects of previous interactions. 175 
Method 176 
Subjects 177 
 We tested 35 non-human great apes (Gorilla gorilla, Pan troglodytes, Pongo 178 
abelii, Pan paniscus) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center at Zoo 179 
Leipzig, Germany. All apes participated in an earlier study using the same setup 180 
(Bohn et al., 2015). Four apes completed only parts of the experiment (see Table S1 181 
in the supplemental material). Participation was voluntary, apes were never food 182 
deprived and water was available ad libitum throughout the experiment. Research was 183 
non-invasive and strictly adhered to the legal requirements of Germany. Animal 184 
husbandry and research complied with the EAZA Minimum Standards for the 185 
Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria and the WAZA Ethical 186 
Guidelines for the Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquarium. 187 
Setup 188 
Apes were presented with two identical plates on a table in front of a Plexiglas 189 
window (see Figure 1). They could request food items placed on these plates one by 190 
one from an experimenter seated on the other side of the table by pointing with their 191 
finger through a hole in front of the respective plate. The experimenter handed the 192 
items over through a third hole in the middle of the panel.  193 
 194 
--- Insert Figure 1 --- 195 
 196 
Procedure  197 
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 Each session comprised two phases, the warm-up phase and the test phase (see 198 
Figure 1). During the warm-up phase both plates were baited with three food items on 199 
each plate. As soon as the subject requested all food items from one plate, the 200 
experimenter left the room. After a ten second delay the test phase began with the 201 
return of an experimenter. During the test phase, one plate contained food items 202 
whereas the other was empty. Subjects were allowed to request further items by either 203 
pointing to the plate containing food or the empty plate. The session ended if the 204 
subject a) pointed to the empty plate, b) requested all remaining visible food items or 205 
c) did not point for 90s. If the subject pointed to the empty plate, the experimenter left 206 
the room and retrieved one more item of the kind that was previously on that plate. 207 
The maximum number of points per session was one for the empty plate and three for 208 
the visible alternative.  209 
Following Bohn et al. (2015) there were two different conditions with respect 210 
to the baiting of the plates. In the same condition, both plates contained the same food 211 
type (HQ = grapes or LQ = pieces of apple or carrot) and in the different condition the 212 
plates contained different food types (one HQ and the other LQ) resulting in 4 213 
different constellations (Table S2 in supplemental material shows the different baiting 214 
constellations). We made sure that the LQ food was desirable for the apes when 215 
presented on its own. If apes were specific in their requests for absent entities, they 216 
should point to the empty plate more often in the different condition (Bohn et al., 217 
2015). 218 
  All apes participated in another study comprising the same setup and the same 219 
E1 immediately prior to the current experiment (Bohn et al., 2015). In this study E1 220 
repeatedly re-baited the plates with food and thereby demonstrated that he was able to 221 
bring new food items. However, apes were never trained to point to empty plates 222 
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during this study. We introduced a novel E2 with whom apes never interacted in a 223 
similar way before (see supplemental material for details). If the same experimenter 224 
returned in the test phase as was present in the warm-up phase she had seen the food 225 
on the now empty plate: see(+), if a different experimenter returned she had not:   226 
see(-). If the returning experimenter was E1, he had demonstrated his ability to bring 227 
more food before: bring(+), if it was E2, she had not: bring(-). This resulted in four 228 
different configurations (see Figure 1). For each of these configurations, each subject 229 
received one session in the same condition and one session in the different condition, 230 
resulting in eight test sessions per individual. For each unique combination of 231 
condition and configuration, subjects received only a single test session. 232 
The order of sessions was counterbalanced across subjects. Due to a two-233 
month hiatus half way through the study apes received additional training sessions 234 
before the second half of the experiment. In these training sessions apes requested 235 
food items presented on a single plate from E1 who re-baited the plate multiple times 236 
with the same kind of food. Importantly, subjects were never rewarded for pointing to 237 
an empty plate during training sessions (see supplemental material for details on 238 
counterbalancing and the training procedure). 239 
In order to point to the empty plate apes had to disregard an otherwise 240 
desirable food item. We therefore expected a rather low rate of pointing to empty 241 
plates. However, this alternative option is crucial to draw conclusions about the 242 
psychological processes underlying subjects’ behaviour. In the absence of an 243 
alternative, apes might consider the relevant aspects of prior interactions with the 244 
experimenter but point to the empty plate nevertheless, simply because they have 245 
nothing else to do (see Bohn et al., 2015 for theoretical and empirical support for the 246 
necessity of an alternative option).  247 
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Coding and analysis 248 
 For each trial in the test-phase we coded whether subjects pointed or not, 249 
through which hole the subject pointed and whether the subject requested absent food 250 
items or not. We defined pointing in the following way: the subject inserted one or 251 
more fingers into one of the holes in the Plexiglas panel so that they protruded on the 252 
other side. We did not code as pointing if the subject simultaneously inserted fingers 253 
into more than one hole at the same time or if subjects inserted a finger while E was 254 
not present. A second coder, blind to the purpose of the study, coded a random 255 
selection of 25% of test-trials. There was a very high agreement of 98.81% between 256 
the two coders (κ = .98). 257 
We used generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with a binomial error 258 
structure to analyse if the binary response (point to absent or not) was influenced by 259 
condition and the different configurations. All models were fitted in R (R Core Team, 260 
2012) using the function glmer of the R-package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 261 
2012). We used likelihood ratio tests (LRT) to assess whether the inclusion of 262 
predictors and their interactions improved the general fit of a model to the data by 263 
comparing models with and without the respective effects (Dobson & Barnett, 2008). 264 
All models comprised subject ID as a random effect to account for repeated testing of 265 
the same individuals.  266 
Results 267 
 We observed a total number of 665 points during test sessions. 639 points 268 
were directed at visible food items and 26 points were directed at the empty plates. As 269 
expected, the rate of pointing to empty plates was low because apes chose the visible 270 
alternative instead (see Bohn et al., 2015 for similar results and supplemental material 271 
for details). Nevertheless, we observed a sufficient number of points to empty plates 272 
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to investigate whether they were influenced by the experimental manipulations. Points 273 
to the empty plate were distributed in the following way: 18 points occurred in the 274 
different condition, 16 of which were directed at the plate that previously contained 275 
HQ food items. Eight occurred in the same condition, five of which in sessions with 276 
LQ food on both sides. The number of points to empty plates did not increase across 277 
test sessions. On the contrary, it decreased across test sessions (see supplemental 278 
material for details). Figure 2 shows how these points were distributed across the 279 
different configurations. In trials in which apes did not point to the empty plate they 280 
pointed to the visible alternative in 99% of trials when E1 had returned and in 97% of 281 
trials when E2 had returned. There was no significant difference in the rate of 282 
pointing in general between E1 and E2 (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, T+ = 253.5, p = 283 
.12).  284 
 285 
--- Insert Figure 2 --- 286 
 287 
A model comprising condition as a fixed within subject effect fitted the data 288 
significantly better compared to a null model lacking it (LRT: χ2(1) = 4.54, p = .033; 289 
GLMM estimate: β = 0.99, 95% CI = [0.08: 2.00]). Apes pointed to the empty plate 290 
more often in the different than in the same condition. This finding replicates the 291 
result of Bohn et al. (2015) and adds to evidence that apes’ points to empty plates 292 
follow a systematic pattern. The inclusion of sex, species and session as fixed effects 293 
did not improve the model fit significantly and these predictors were therefore 294 
dropped for the subsequent analysis (LRT: χ2(5) = 5.28, p > .250). To determine 295 
whether the previous interactions with the experimenter further influenced apes’ 296 
pointing to empty plates we added see, bring and the interactions with condition up to 297 
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the third order as fixed within subject effects. Inclusion of these predictors 298 
significantly improved the model fit compared to the model only comprising 299 
condition (LRT: χ2(6) = 22.14, p = .001). This result shows that apes’ requests for 300 
absent entities were influenced by the previous interactions with the experimenter. 301 
Subsequently, we investigated the contribution of see and bring to this result 302 
in more detail by looking at the three-way interaction between condition, see and 303 
bring. This interaction was not significant (LRT: χ2(1) = 0.37, p > .250). We therefore 304 
removed the three-way interaction and looked at the two-way interactions among 305 
condition, see and bring. We found a significant interaction between condition and 306 
bring (LRT: χ2(1) = 5.49, p = .019; GLMM estimate: β = 2.62, 95% CI = [0.44: 307 
5.08]). Apes pointed more often to an empty plate in the different condition if the 308 
returning experimenter provided additional food items in previous interactions. In 309 
contrast, we found no effect of the interactions between condition and see (LRT: χ2(1) 310 
= 0.05, p > .250) or see and bring (LRT: χ2(1) = 0.02, p > .250). After excluding the 311 
non-significant two-way interactions we found a main effect of see (LRT: χ2(1) = 312 
4.97, p = .026; GLMM estimate: β = 1.12, 95% CI = [0.13: 2.24]). Apes pointed more 313 
often to an empty plate if the experimenter had previously seen the content of the 314 
plate. 315 
Discussion 316 
 Great apes flexibly adjusted their requests for absent entities depending on 317 
three factors: the previous content of a now empty plate (condition), whether the 318 
experimenter had seen the content of the now empty plate (see) and whether the 319 
experimenter provided additional food items in a previous interaction (bring). This is 320 
evidence that apes tracked the relevant aspects of previous interactions with their 321 
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interlocutor and considered them when engaging in subsequent communicative 322 
interactions with him or her. 323 
 These results cannot be explained by task specific associative learning or 324 
simple heuristics. First, apes only received one test session for each combination of 325 
condition and configuration so that each subject could only contribute one point to 326 
empty plates for each of these combinations. Any association formed as a 327 
consequence of being rewarded for pointing to the empty plate could therefore not 328 
influence the result of that specific combination any further. If being rewarded for 329 
pointing to the empty plate had any effect at all, it should have increased the number 330 
of points to empty plates in subsequent test sessions regardless of combination. 331 
However, this was not the case since the number of points to empty plates decreased 332 
rather than increased in later sessions (see supplemental material for details). Second, 333 
apes did not simply associate E1 with more food as they only pointed more often for 334 
him in the different condition. Finally, our results cannot be explained by a general 335 
unwillingness to point for E2, since the rate of pointing in general did not differ 336 
between the E1 and E2. Taken together this suggests that apes’ requests were not 337 
directly influenced by the amount and kind of food they got from each experimenter 338 
but rather by how they interacted with him/her previously. Next we discuss in more 339 
detail the factors that affected subjects’ choices and their interpretation. 340 
 Overall, apes were specific in their requests as they requested more absent 341 
entities in the different condition, i.e. when the previous content of the now empty 342 
plate was of higher quality than the visible content of the other plate. This finding 343 
replicates the earlier study by Bohn et al. (2015). More importantly, we found that the 344 
type of interaction they had with the experimenter previously further modulated these 345 
specific requests. Apes requested specific absent entities more often from an 346 
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experimenter (E1) who previously demonstrated his competence to provide additional 347 
food than from a novel experimenter (E2). Even if E2 had just given them HQ items 348 
in the different condition, they did not request additional items from her. These results 349 
show that apes communicated with a specific individual about specific absent entities. 350 
This kind of spontaneous and flexible adjustment of communicative acts to past social 351 
interactions goes beyond what has been shown in earlier studies in which 352 
chimpanzees were directly trained to inhibit and redirect communicative acts in the 353 
presence of specific individuals (Woodruff & Premack, 1979). Moreover, the 354 
differential pattern of responses suggests that apes may have ascribed a general 355 
competence to E1 (“able to bring more of what was previously on that plate”) instead 356 
of an object specific one (“able to bring grapes”). In the latter case they should not 357 
have adjusted their requests to the previous content of the plate as well and should 358 
have made more requests in the same condition with LQ items on both plates.  359 
However, since we did not counterbalance the identity of E1, we cannot rule 360 
out that apes’ evaluation of E1’s ability to provide additional food items was solely 361 
based on our experimental manipulations. It is conceivable that other factors such as 362 
E1’s gender or general appearance, rather than the specific past interactions with E1, 363 
might have been responsible for the effect of bring. While such an alternative 364 
explanation is certainly possible, we think that it is highly unlikely that apes’ prior 365 
experiences outside the studies considered here led them to learn that only E1 (or 366 
other humans who resembled E1) would provide additional food items after pointing 367 
to their previous location. We think that it is more likely that the specific experiences 368 
with E1 during training trials and the study by Bohn et al. (2015), which involved the 369 
same setup and food items, influenced how apes communicated with E1 in the current 370 
study. 371 
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 We also found that apes were more likely to point to the empty plate if the 372 
returning experimenter had seen the content of the now empty plate, regardless of his 373 
competence and condition. This result is in line with previous research showing that 374 
apes adjust their behaviour depending on whether another individual has experienced 375 
something or not (Crockford et al., 2012; Hare et al., 2001). The presence of a main 376 
effect of see rather than an interaction between see and condition reveals how subjects 377 
judged the importance of the two factors relative to one another. The general rate of 378 
pointing for absent entities for E2 – bring(-) – was too low to differ between the two 379 
conditions or the two levels of see (see Figure 2). This means that the experimenter’s 380 
competence was a necessary requirement for see or condition to have an effect at all. 381 
This is reminiscent of apes preferentially begging from a human whose face was 382 
oriented towards them but only when that human was in a position in which she was 383 
capable of handing over food (body oriented towards the ape) (Kaminski et al., 2004). 384 
When her body was oriented away from the ape, they generally begged less from her 385 
and did not care about her face orientation anymore.  386 
Even though we observed most points to empty plates in the different 387 
condition for an experimenter who was knowledgeable as well as competent, apes 388 
also requested specific absent entities from E1 when E1 had not seen the absent food 389 
before (see Figure 2). This suggests that apes did not take into account the 390 
interdependent nature of knowledge and competence. In order to use a location to 391 
request more of its previous content, it is not sufficient to know that the other person 392 
is willing and able to provide more food, at the same time it is necessary to know 393 
whether she knows what the location contained previously. If we are willing to see the 394 
adjustment for knowledge and competence in this study as cases of attribution of 395 
psychological states, we might conclude that apes are limited in their ability to 396 
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integrate different psychological states of the same individual. This might help to 397 
explain why great ape communication among conspecifics is usually based on 398 
naturally meaningful embodied behaviours instead of more ambiguous signals that 399 
require a detailed tracking of common ground (Moore, 2013; Tomasello, 2008). 400 
However, future research should investigate if these results are specific to 401 
communicative interactions about absent entities or constitute a general limitation of 402 
great apes’ social-cognitive abilities. As we highlighted in the introduction, this study 403 
did not address full-blown common ground but only its necessary prerequisites. 404 
Following studies with children (Moll, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007) it would be 405 
necessary to vary how apes learn about the experimenter’s psychological states (in 406 
joint engagement or while eavesdropping) to determine whether they consider how 407 
psychological states come to be shared between individuals. 408 
In sum, these results show that great apes consider relevant aspects of previous 409 
interactions with other individuals that are necessary prerequisites to form common 410 
ground with them. However, our results also suggest that apes might be limited in 411 
their ability to integrate different psychological states of an individual simultaneously. 412 
Overall, our study sheds light on the social embedding of great apes’ communicative 413 
abilities and thereby helps to identify the evolutionary foundations on which human 414 
communication rests.   415 
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Figures an Captions 522 
 523 
Figure 1. Schematic overview for (a) the basic setup with two baited plates, (b) the 524 
experimenters involved in the study, (c) the two different variants of the warm-up 525 
phase and (d) the resulting four different configurations in the test phase (with two 526 
different conditions per configuration). Subjects received a single test session per 527 
condition for each configuration. Subjects could request food items by pointing 528 
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 532 
Figure 2. Number of points to empty plates per configuration and condition. Each 533 
subject received one test session per condition in each configuration. 534 
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